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Introduksjon
Diplomacy is all about mediating between political units. 
It is defined by procedures that allow adversaries, even en-
emies, to talk to each other. At first glance, therefore, the 
identification of ‘dialogue’ as a central tool of foreign policy 
is trivial, since diplomacy must necessarily imply dialogue 
of some sort. But the question of the nature and effects of 
dialogue in preventing and resolving conflicts go far beyond 
the question of whether one should talk to ones enemies. 
One central issue is whether one should refrain from en-
gaging in dialogue with some actors because they hold val-
ues that are diametrically opposed to ones’ own. Another 
is whether dialogue – alone or in combination with other 
policies – is effective in preventing and resolving conflicts. 
The answer to the question of the role and effectiveness of 
dialogue in resolving international conflicts turns on how 
dialogue is defined and whether one believes that it can have 
a transformative effect on the behaviour and values of ac-
tors. Jonas Gahr Støre has formulated a position where the 
burden of proof is on those that rule out engaging in dia-
logue. Successive American Presidents have opted for the 
opposite view, defining some actors as beyond the pale, not 
worthy of direct talks. 
This policy brief builds on a recent NUPI-report where we 
seek to contribute to a better understanding of the virtues, 
and limits, of dialogue in efforts to resolve or manage in-
ternational conflicts (Rieker and Sending 2012). We do so 
by analysing three distinct crises where fundamental values 
have been at stake and where there has been considerable 
uncertainty on both sides about the intentions and actions 
of the other. These are: i) the evolving Russo–Georgian con-
flict, ii) the conflict between Western powers and Libya from 
the late 1990s onwards, and iii) the conflict over Iran’s nu-
clear programme over the past decade.1 We ask three inter-
related questions:
1. What was the character of the dialogue between the actors 
prior to, during, and after the ‘peak’ of the conflict/crisis?
2. To what extent has the dialogue contributed to a peaceful 
solution?
3. What determines whether a dialogue can succeed or not? 
Dialogue in time of crisis
Dialogue implies a willingness to learn and be persuaded by 
the force of the better argument. As such, dialogue is some-
thing of a paradox in world politics: while it is a defining 
feature of diplomacy and is frequently called upon to ease 
tensions and avoid conflicts, it is also quite often consid-
ered a sign of weakness, since dialogue implies – precisely 
– a willingness to change one’s position and be persuaded by 
others’ arguments (Kagan 2008). This becomes particularly 
acute when conflicts over basic values of a society are at stake, 
and when the relationship between those involved has been 
defined in terms of enmity. For Robert Mnookin, there are 
times when political leaders must quite simply choose to fight 
rather than talk: ‘In an age of terror, our political leaders are 
faced with this sort of question every day. Should we negoti-
ate with the Taliban? Iran? North Korea?’ (Mnookin 2010). 
Subsequent US administrations have adopted this stance, 
opting either to fight (Taliban) or to demand as preconditions 
for talks the very things that are at stake in the conflict (Iran). 
Mnookin’s central point is that it is impossible to enter into a 
dialogue with those whose values one fundamentally rejects 
without violating one’s own integrity. 
The Norwegian government has adopted a different stance, 
rejecting the idea that dialogue with those whose values 
are fundamentally different somehow serves to legitimize 
them. Instead, the argument is that it is precisely when fun-
damental values collide that it is important to engage in dia-
logue. Former Norwegian Foreign Minister Støre argues, 
for example, that ‘engaging in dialogue with a group and its 
members is not the same thing as legitimizing its goals and 
ideology. Used skilfully, engagement may moderate their 
policies and behaviour’ (Støre 2011). 
These two positions rest on fundamentally different concep-
tions of what dialogue is and what it can achieve. An impor-
tant research task is therefore to assess empirically how dia-
logue – in isolation or combined with other factors – may help 
to shape outcomes. Can dialogue, by itself, help to change 
actors’ behaviour? Is dialogue always a positive thing? Can 
1 The following authors have contributed with case studies: Sverre 
Lodgaard on Iran, Jakub Godzimirski on the Russo-Georgian con-
flict and Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer and Pernille Rieker on Libya.
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other polity tools – such as sanctions – operate effectively in 
combination with and through the medium of dialogue? 
We study dialogue in times of crises because it typically in-
volves not only conflicting values but also uncertainty about 
the intentions of the others. As such, it offers a good vantage 
point from which to assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of dialogue as a tool of foreign policy. For the purpose of 
this report, we define a ‘crisis’ as a set of interlinked events 
where i) there is uncertainty on the part of actors about how 
best to advance their interests; ii) there are clashing values 
and interests, with high stakes involved; and iii) the actors 
are unsure about the facts of the situation and about the 
strategies of other actors.
Inter-cultural dialogue and cases 
By ‘dialogue’ we mean the exchange of ideas or opinions 
on a particular issue, with a view to reaching an amicable 
agreement or settlement. The robustness of dialogue – as 
a foreign policy tool – will depend crucially on how it func-
tions and shapes actors in different settings. Much hing-
es on whether dialogue aims to promote understanding, 
whether it aims to change actors’ identities and interests, 
or whether it (merely) seeks to avoid escalation and the use 
of violence. Moreover, the motivations for engaging in a 
dialogue may differ. In some cases, actors may engage in 
dialogue for instrumental or tactical reasons, with no real 
commitment to peaceful resolution of the conflict in ques-
tion. In other cases, dialogue may be imposed upon the 
parties by the UN Security Council without there being a 
sufficient commitment to reach an agreement. Below, we 
discuss briefly some salient features of dialogue as part of 
the toolbox of diplomacy.
Dialogue with counterparts within the same culture, where 
actors typically share a set of values enabling communica-
tion and the resolution of conflicts, can be difficult enough. 
Doing so in the international realm, where there are often 
conflicting value systems, and no overarching authority to 
sanction an agreement, is even more difficult. There is of-
ten a lack of trust, even outright suspicion, and frequently 
– as displayed in the cases in this study – no real interest 
in reaching a consensus. As Jennifer Mitzen has observed, 
commenting on Habermas’ theory of communicative ac-
tion, ‘strangers might not see consensus as desirable; they 
might not recognize one another as capable of communi-
cative consensus at all, much less be willing to listen and 
reflect on each other’s arguments’ (Mitzen 2005: : 404). 
For Dominique Moïsi (2009), the feelings of fear, humilia-
tion and hope are central to the types of conflicts that we an-
alyse here. He argues that the West has been dominated by 
a culture of fear – fear of the ‘Other’ and of foreign cultures 
– because it anxiously tries to maintain global dominance. 
In the Arab and Muslim world, a culture of humiliation is 
in operation, which feeds into Islamic extremism, leading 
to hatred of the West. Meanwhile, much of Asia has been 
able to concentrate on building a better future, creating a 
culture of hope. These moods, of course, are not universal 
within each region, and there are some areas, like Russia 
and parts of Latin America, that seem to display all of these 
simultaneously. Peter Coleman (2011) has picked up on the 
centrality of emotions, arguing that when emotions over-
shadow how the actors define what the conflict is about, the 
much-lauded integrative approach described above simply 
will not work. Conflicts that are fuelled by emotions, Cole-
man argues, are highly destructive and make up an esti-
mated 5% of the conflicts that are seemingly intractable. 
In the recent NUPI report we try to investigate this issue more 
closely. In fact, we try to find out if dialogue is simply cheap 
talk, or whether it can contribute to resolve international con-
flicts, and perhaps even lead to fundamental change.
There are different types of dialogue. Without going into the 
theoretical debates and the different approaches that are dis-
cussed in the report, we will just present a simple fourfold 
table with different dialogue options with two parties. While 
most approaches to dialogue and negotiations involve a 
presupposition that negotiations are zero-sum transactions 
with winners and losers (1-3), there is one approach that that 
aims at win-win solutions, meaning that both parties are 
winners by making the ‘pie’ bigger. This is often presented 
as an ideal – and perhaps the only result that will actually 
lead to stable agreements over time. Still, one may question 
whether it is possible to achieve win-win solution in deep 
rooted conflicts where each of the parties might prefer op-
tion 3 or 2 (win-lose options)?
The cases
Below, we summarize key findings from the three case stud-
ies. We conclude that dialogue is a necessary but not a suf-
ficient tool with which to shape political outcomes. Changes 
in the political situation - or more fundamentally in the core 
constituencies on which political leaders depend – is consist-
ently what best explains changes in positions. We observe, 
further, that references to ‘dialogue’ can be used to legitimize 
the continued use of violence or to stall negotiations, and 
that western powers have a tendency to universalize their 
preferred solutions, thereby undercutting their effectiveness 
to engage meaningfully to achieve core objectives.
Russia-Georgia
First, we study the Russian-Georgian conflict and the in-
tense dialogues that took place in relation to the confron-
tation in 2008. While this is a bilateral territorial conflict, 
much more was at stake in that Georgia so clearly oriented 
itself towards the West. The Russian military intervention 
has therefore been referred to as a Russian ‘proxy war with 
the west’. While the dialogue between Russia and Georgia 
actually broke down in 2008 and resulted in war, the war 
also ended through successful dialogue and negotiations 
through the help of the West and the EU as a third party. So 
– this case is an example where the dialogue first failed and 
then succeeded. But then it is important to note that while 
dialogue had some significance in managing the Russia-
Georgian conflict after the 2008 war, it did not resolve the 
underlying territorial conflict.
Libya
In the case of Libya, or rather the cases of Libya as there 
were several conflicts, like the negotiations concerning the 
Lockerbie terrorists and the sanctions regime in the 1990s, 
concerning the WMD programme in 2003, and also the 
imprisoned Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor in 
2007. These conflicts between Libya and the West were very 
much linked to Libya’s and Colonel Gaddafi’s support to in-
ternational terrorism. All these negotiations seem to fit with 
elements of a win-win approach where Gaddafi agreed to 
cooperate with the west as long as Libya and he was accred-
ited some form of recognition by the international commu-
nity. But also here the underlying conflict (based on a lack of 
trust) remained until the military intervention in 2011 that, 
finally, resulted in regime change.
Iran
The third case is on Iran and its nuclear programme. But 
this is also at a deeper level, a manifestation of a more funda-
mental conflict over the future political landscape in the Mid-
dle East. The talks, which have been accompanied by strong 
sticks and modest carrots, have not brought the parties closer 
to a solution. In fact, mutual mistrust reigns, and the conflict 
seems to fall squarely in the estimated five per cent category 
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3of conflicts (that are seemingly impossible to solve) referred 
to by Coleman (2011). Changes in domestic or international 
contexts may generate stronger incentives for de-escalation, 
but it is highly uncertain that continued talks will produce 
more than posturing on each side.
The nature and limits of dialogue
Based on this comparative analysis, we find that dialogue 
is important as a diplomatic tool, but that the conditions 
needed for a win-win solution are seldom present in inter-
cultural conflicts. Even though such an outcome seems 
achievable in some specific cases, it is often limited due to 
a prevailing underlying conflict. Such agreements can pro-
vide temporary stability, but are also easily undone. 
This indicates that it is difficult to hold that dialogue with 
those who hold fundamentally different values and inter-
est can change their behaviour. Or rather: contact with such 
groups may open the way for the application of a host of 
other foreign policy tools aimed at changing their behaviour 
and policies, which may be effective over time. It can be 
anything from the threat of or use of sanctions to the offer-
ing of economic incentives and political support. Staying 
engaged and having contact with actors, then, may render 
possible the application of other policy tools that may be ef-
fective over time in changing actors’ interests and willing-
ness to negotiate. Below, we highlight some general obser-
vations that emerge from our comparative analysis and that 
may point towards some more general lessons or insights. 
Lessons
All cases under analysis here supports the view that dia-
logue can be a useful tool but that there is little inherent 
in dialogue that promote mutual understanding and en-
during, peaceful agreements. Dialogue may be delibera-
tive and serve to change actors’ interests and behaviour, but 
this seems to presuppose trust and a shared communica-
tive horizon. The types of conflict that we analyse here are 
characterized precisely of a lack of such trust. A more com-
prehensive approach or set of dialogues at various levels 
and between different actors might be necessary in order to 
reach a win-win solution in such enduring conflicts (Cole-
man 2011). Based on the comparative analysis we have un-
dertaken, we highlight six lessons that can serve as a point 
of departure for ways to possibly make engagement and dia-
logue a more effective tool.
1. Actors’ behaviour and positions may change as a result of 
changing international or domestic circumstances, not as a re-
sult of dialogue itself. 
In the case of Iran, there has been little willingness for dia-
logue and the few attempts we have seen, have been moti-
vated out of an attempt to avoid war (or perhaps to legiti-
mise war on a later stage) rather than out of a fundamental 
belief that negotiation would increase the understanding 
between the parties. Mistrust and internal constraints on 
both sides have put huge limits on the negotiations. The 
few examples of progress in the negotiations have not been 
followed up, rather on the contrary. In the case of Libya, we 
also see that both geopolitical and domestic factors are at 
play in all of the different dialogue situations and that the 
dialogue is a facilitating mechanism, but not a mechanism 
that changes the fundamentals in the conflict or solve the 
underlying conflicts. It was of course a necessary and im-
portant tool and the different negotiated results were real 
and important, but the reason for the breakthroughs must 
primarily be found elsewhere – sometimes internationally, 
sometimes domestically. In this case the underlying conflict 
was not solved and this also explains why Libya could go 
so rapidly from being a foe to be a friend and then, in the 
end, to be a foe again. Similarly, the conflict between Russia 
and Georgia is of the enduring kind in the sense that the 
underlying conflict is not solved. In this conflict we also see 
other factors than the dialogue itself that may explain the 
outcome. As we have seen Russia could accept the condi-
tions presented by France and the EU since it had beaten 
Georgia on the ground. Geopolitics and power politics are 
important here since this conflict also can be interpreted as 
a Russian-Western conflict
2. Dialogue rarely transforms actors’ values and identity and 
is therefore seldom sufficient to solve deep rooted conflicts even 
though it may affect both the timing of events and the nature of 
the measures that are adopted.
As such, dialogue is merely an opportunity to build trust so 
that – over time – pragmatic solutions may be found if there 
is sufficient willingness to compromise. Win-win approach-
es to dialogue seem to have its limits when the aim is to 
find a solution to long term and deep rooted conflicts or as 
an approach to negotiate between regimes that have a radi-
cally different normative basis. Such an approach requires 
mutual confidence and trust, and as we have seen, the con-
flicts under analysis here have parties that do not readily 
lend themselves to such an approach. The reason for that 
is that these particular conflicts are in part about the actors’ 
identities and attendant foundational values. The limited 
successes of dialogue in the Georgia-Russian conflict and 
that between Libya and the West are interesting, but even in 
these cases the underlying conflicts were not addressed. In 
the case of Iran, on the other hand, the underlying conflict 
seems to prevent dialogue from taking place at all. For long 
periods of time, the talks have been limited to exchange of 
positions. Both in the Libya case and the Georgia-Russian 
case timing also seem to be important and could partly ex-
plain the successes of the negotiations.
3. Lack of enforcement mechanisms in international politics 
makes any negotiated agreement fragile. As a result, agreements 
based on dialogue needs enforcements mechanisms.
Dialogue can result in agreements and breakthroughs, but 
because dialogue, in and of itself, does not contain enforce-
ment mechanisms, any breakthrough or agreement is in-
herently unstable: it can easily unravel in the absence of an 
anchor or enforcement mechanism, which rarely exist at 
the international level. There are many examples of peace 
agreements and breakthroughs that have unravelled at a lat-
er stage precisely because a consensus/agreement at t-1 can 
be undone at t-2 by a change in domestic interests or inter-
national conditions. Libya is clearly an example of that, but 
also the various failed negotiation attempts between Iran 
and the West. Finally, the Georgian-Russian peace agree-
ment of 2008 was successful, but since the underlying con-
flict is not solved there is no guarantee that it will prevail.
4. Dialogue or talk is ‘cheap’ and may easily be used to legitimize 
or offer cover for other more aggressive strategies. 
The three cases show how dialogue is often used as a foil 
to advance objectives that increase rather than decrease 
tensions. Indeed, a central feature of dialogue – diplomacy 
– is that it is considered progressive and bears promise of 
peaceful solutions. Because of this, engaging in diplomatic 
processes often serve to legitimize strategies that are any-
thing but progressive. For instance, this is clearly the case 
with Iran where initiatives for dialogues are advanced in 
parallel to rather aggressive statements and actions from 
both sides. Libya in 2011 and the first phase of the Russian-
Georgian conflict in 2008 may also be referred to as exam-
ples of attempts to use dialogue to legitimize more aggres-
sive approaches.
5. The character of the dialogue seem to differ dependent on 
whether the negotiation is undertaken by experts or by more 
moderate parties, by parties that are heavily involved in the con-
flict or if it is facilitated by a neutral third party.
As the three cases have shown, it is often useful to have 
interlocutors that are either pragmatic and/or have a cer-
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tain distance to the conflict. In the Iranian case, construc-
tive explorations of common ground were made when Ali 
Larijani, a pragmatist, and Javier Solana was negotiating. 
This is interesting even though it did not result in anything 
concrete and that it ended with Ahmadinejad replacing 
Larijani by a less pragmatic negotiator. In the Libyan case, 
more neutral parties were often chosen to transmit the mes-
sage from the regime and the dialogue succeeded when the 
more moderate forces were representing the regime. Final-
ly the Russia-Georgian conflict clearly shows that a neutral 
third party may be of a certain importance. 
6. The character of negotiations differs depending on the level 
of secrecy.
In the report, we refer to negative and positive sides of se-
cret negotiations. While secrecy may facilitate the initiation 
of talks and prevent popular interference in the process, 
talks undertaken in public make it easier for arguments to 
commit over time. Even though the negotiations are seldom 
transparent, it is often known that they are conducted. This 
has been the case in the dialogue with Iran and in the Geor-
gian-Russian conflict. While the Iranian conflict can refer to 
few or no results, the negotiations in the Georgian-Russian 
conflict succeeded even thought they were public. In some 
cases, however, the fact that the parties meet at all is also 
a secret. This was the case in most of the negotiations be-
tween Libya and the West, which was at least partially suc-
cessful. This means that it is difficult to draw a conclusion 
on what to prefer and that this is highly dependent on the 
character of the conflict. 
7. Western states often adopt a top-down approach, making it 
more difficult to generate trust and establish a genuine dialogue. 
Armed with a sense of supremacy anchored in a combina-
tion of material preponderance and a claim to universal val-
ues, western powers often demand concessions from others 
as a precondition for starting negotiations. As the Iran and 
Libya cases both demonstrate, the ‘imperial’ or top-down at-
titude of western states generates tensions that undermine 
the effectiveness of dialogue. It is, we argue, no coincidence 
that Turkey and Brazil did broker a deal with Iran while 
EU3 or the US could not. Libya, Iran and Russia, all want-
ed/wants to be recognized as significant players in their 
respective region, a recognition that is often not accorded 
to them by significant others (US, EU, ‘west’). There is a 
paradox here: While great powers are generally needed to 
guarantee and make parties commit to an agreement, they 
are often not the best mediators because of a tendency to try 
to universalize their particular interests. Conversely, small 
and medium-sized powers can be good mediators, but they 
are often unable to make the parties stick to an agreement 
because they lack the resources to sanction them.
8. Dialogue is more effective at preventing conflicts than resolv-
ing them. 
We have assessed the nature and effects of dialogue in 
three cases and concluded that it is only effective as part of 
a larger battery of diplomatic tools. Nonetheless, it is quite 
certain that not having a dialogue can heighten the risk of 
misunderstandings and further push actors in the direction 
of positions that preclude any possibility of an agreement. 
Indeed, dialogue is perhaps most effective in preventing ten-
sions from becoming manifest conflicts. As all the cases show, 
the fundamentals of each conflict are based on historically 
received and politically nurtured ideas about the other. If 
anything, dialogue can help nuance and transform under-
standings of others and increase the capacity to recognize 
and tolerate difference.
Concluding remarks
The three cases that we have studied here points in the di-
rection of two general implications. First, dialogue is dif-
ficult and the likelihood for failure is high. This means that 
the possibility of resolving underlying conflicts is often 
limited. In fact, containment and resolving of immediate 
disputes is often what is realistic to achieve. Secondly, in or-
der to achieve more enduring agreements and fundamental 
changes, an approach that promotes mutual respect and 
trust is required. It seems like a prerequisite for reaching 
such a situation is the promotion a broader set of dialogues 
at various levels and between different actors in order to 
reach a win-win solution in enduring conflicts. 
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